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The "Rule of Law" in Hong Kong After
1997
JOHN MCDERMOTT *
I. INTRODUcTION
On July 1, 1997, jurisdiction- over Hong Kong will pass from
Great Britain, which has ruled Hong Kong for over 150 years, to
the People's Republic of China (PRC). As that date approaches,
anxiety over Hong Kong's future as a financial and legal center
increases. In an effort to ameliorate this growing anxiety, Daniel
Fung, the first Chinese Solicitor General of Hong Kong,1
embarked on a month-long speaking tour in the United States. On
February 8, 1996, he stopped at Loyola Law School, where he was
the featured speaker at a conference organized by Loyola
Marymount University's Center for Asian Business.
Although Hong Kong has never been a democracy, it has
enjoyed a legal system as reliable as any other democratic system
in the world. Indeed, Mr. Fung considers Hong Kong's legal
system to be "Britain's greatest and most treasured legacy to Hong
Kong."2  When the colony is transferred back to the PRC's
jurisdiction in a few months, a crucial question concerns the future
• Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. I was asked to respond to Daniel Fung's
speech. This Article summarizes the concerns expressed in my response. The views ex-
pressed in this Article are not necessarily the views of Loyola Law School, Loyola Mary-
mount University, or any other sponsors of the conference held on February 8, 1996 at
Loyola Law School in Los Angeles.
1. Mr. Fung, as Solicitor General of Hong Kong is responsible for "overseeing the
legal policy of the Hong Kong government" until it becomes a part of the PRC later this
year. Mr. Fung spent 18 years in private practice before becoming solicitor general in
1994. He. was the first Hong Kong Chinese to hold the position. See Brian Cummings,
Hong Kong Will Preserve Its Legal Heritage, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 7, 1996, at 3. It
is unclear whether he will continue to serve as Solicitor General after July 1, 1997.
2. Id
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of the legal system and the continuation of the rule of law in Hong
Kong.
The PRC has promised Hong Kong "a high degree of
autonomy" after it recovers the colony this year Optimists expect
the present legal structure to continue operating, resulting in the
continuation of the enormous economic benefits associated with a
stable and independent legal system in Hong Kong. Pessimists
assume that Hong Kong law will resemble law elsewhere in the
PRC-always open to manipulation for political reasons or special
interests. Mr. Fung is cautiously optimistic;4 I am pessimistic, but
hopeful the optimists turn out to be right.5
II. BACKGROUND
Under the Treaty of Nanking,6 which officially ended the
Opium War between Great Britain and China, China ceded the
island of Hong Kong to Great Britain in perpetuity.7  In 1860,
China also ceded the Kowloon Peninsula to Great Britain in
perpetuity.8 The Kowloon Peninsula, which today is an integral
part of Hong Kong, is part of the Chinese mainland,
approximately one mile from the island of Hong Kong. Great
3. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the of the People's Republic of China on
the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C.,- 23 I.L.M. 1371, 1371
[hereinafter Joint Declaration].
4. In Hong Kong, the phrase "cautious optimism" seems to mirror the famous Hong
Kong motto, "Hope for the best, prepare for the worst." Henry J. Reske, Experts Fear
Hong Kong Legal System in PeriL Despite Predictions, Law Society President Believes Re-
version to Chinese Rule Will Not Erode Freedoms, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 33 (quoting
Roderick B. Woo, president of the Law Society of Hong Kong).
5. For a prediction as to Hong Kong's economic future, see John H. Henderson, The
Reintegration of Horig Kong Into the People's Republic of China: What it Means to Hong
Kong's Future Prosperity, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503 (1995) (concluding that
"although the future prosperity of Hong Kong is bright, Hong Kong has already reached
its peak as a leading economic and financial center.").
For a discussion of the potential impact of the PRC takeover of Hong Kong on
U.S. business interests, see A.R. Yee, Hong Kong and China in 1997: An Examination of
Possible Legal and Economic Implications for United States Businesses, 36 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 595 (1996).
6. Treaty Between China and Great Britain, Aug. 29, 1842, China-Gr. Brit., 93 Con-
sol. T.S. 465.
7. See id
8. Convention of Friendship, Oct. 24, 1860, China-Gr. Brit., 123 Consol. T.S. 71.
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Britain acquired the final component of present-day Hong Kong in
1898 when it persuaded China to lease to it the New Territories for
ninety-nine years. 9 Today, the New Territories, which are adjacent
to the Kowloon peninsula and also part of the Chinese mainland,
are primarily industrial and residential areas for most Hong Kong
factory workers. Thus, contrary to a popular misconception, Great
Britain was not obligated to return all of Hong Kong to the PRC in
1997, but only the New Territories.'0
The New Territories have become such an important part of
present-day Hong Kong, however, that all parties realized the
impracticality of treating it independently. Indeed, the PRC
refused to enter into any negotiations regarding any part of
present-day Hong Kong unless it was treated as a single territory."
Thus, the expiration of the New Territories lease in 1997 may be
viewed as the functional equivalent of the termination of British
interests in all of Hong Kong.
III. THE JOINT DECLARATION
In the early 1980s, in anticipation of the upcoming expiration
of the New Territories lease, Great Britain began negotiations
with the PRC over the fate of Hong Kong. These negotiations
reached fruition on September 26, 1984 when the United Kingdom
and the PRC approved the Joint Declaration of the Government
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (Joint
Declaration), 2 which provides that the United Kingdom will
relinquish sovereign control over Hong Kong on June 30, 1997 at
midnight." The Joint Declaration also provides that the PRC's
9. See Convention Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898,
China-Gr. Brit., 186 Consol. T.S. 310 [hereinafter Convention of 1898].
10. For a discussion of all of these agreements, see PETER WESLEY-SMITH,
UNEQUALTREATY 1898-1997 (1980).
11. See John H. Henderson, The Reintegration of Hong Kong into the People's Re-
public of China: What It Means to Hong Kong's Future Prosperity, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 509 (1995). The New Territories are also Hong Kong's sole source
of drinking water. See id. at 509 n. 25. The PRC threatened to discontinue Hong Kong's
water supply, a threat the British believegi to be quite credible. See id.
12. Joint Declaration, supra note 3.
13. See iU, para. 1, at 1371.
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National People's Congress will enact the Basic Law for
implementation purposes. 4  ,
Mr. Fung, like his colleagues in Hong Kong and Great
Britain, views the Joint Declaration as an international agreement
that is binding on the PRC.'5 The PRC, on the other hand, views it
as a "domestic agreement" that it can unilaterally override."
Further, the PRC may consider the Joint Declaration to be binding
only during the transitional period from 1984, when the Joint
Declaration was signed, to June 30, 1997, when sovereignty is
returned to the PRC and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Basic
Law)17 takes effect as the law of Hong Kong.'
14. See id., para. 3(12), at 1372. Other important major provisions of the Joint Dec-
laration include:
1. In 1997, Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China and will enjoy a "high degree of autonomy," except in matters per-
taining to foreign affairs and defense.
2. Hong Kong will have separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and each
branch will be composed of Hong Kong residents.
3. The PRC will appoint Hong Kong's chief executive after elections or consultation in
Hong Kong.
4. Hong Kong will maintain capitalistic economic and trade systems for fifty years after
1997.
5. The existing social and economic system will remain unchanged. The law will protect
freedom of speech, movement, press, assembly, and religion, as well as private property
rights.
6. Hong Kong may use the name "Hong Kong, China" in international organizations
and trade agreements.
7. The PRC's defense force stationed in Hong Kong will not interfere with the internal
affairs of Hong Kong.
See Henderson, supra note 11, at 511-12.
15. See, Daniel Fung, Speech at Loyola Marymount University's Center for Asian
Business' Conference (Feb. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Speech by Daniel Fung]. The British
Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, "doubts" that the PRC will "renege on its prom-
ises," but if it does, the British government has threatened to bring it "to the attention of
the international community." Wyng Chow, Capitalism Will Survive in Hong Kong, Law-
yer Says: Basic Law Key to China's Commitment, VANCOUVER SUN, May 24, 1996, at DI
available in 1996 WL 5008695.
16. See Henderson, supra note 5, at 519; see also Agnes J. Bundy, The Reunification
of China with Hong Kong and Its Implications for Taiwan An Analysis of the "One
Country, Two Systems" Model, 19 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 271,273-74 (1989).
17. Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Re-
public of China (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law].
18. See Henderson, supra note 11, at 519.
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The Joint Declaration is a vaguely worded agreement
between Britain and the PRC on the basic policies the PRC will
follow in governing Hong Kong after July 1, 1997.19 Even the
optimistic admit that the Joint Declaration "leaves much to the
imagination." 20 Even if it is viewed as an international agreement,
it seems unlikely that it could ever be enforced in a meaningful
way.
IV. THE BASIC LAW
Unlike the Joint Declaration, which is a bilateral quasi-treaty,
the Basic Law is. a pure Chinese document. The National People's
Congress of the PRC created the committee that drafted the Basic
Law. 2' The majority of Committee members were from the PRC.
The National People's Congress formally adopted the Basic Law
in 1990.
The Basic Law is often referred to as "Hong Kong's
constitution,"' ' although it is not incorporated into the PRC's
constitution and cannot be considered the supreme law of the land,
even if such a law existed in the PRC.2 Thus, a subsequent act of
the National People's Congress could annul the Basic Law, if the
PRC deemed such an act necessary. In essence, the Basic Law
guarantees that the "laws previously in force in Hong Kong...
shall be maintained."
19. See Alysha Webb, Promises: A Primer on the Joint Declaration and the Hong
Kong SAR Basic Law, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1996, at S15, available in 1996 WL-
WSJA 12479537.
20. Id.
21. At the time, Mr. Fung was a barrister in Hong Kong and was a member of the
drafting committee. See Cummings, supra note 1.
22 Many conimentators have said that the Basic Law confers more specific rights
and freedoms on Hong Kong residents that the U.S. Constitution affords its residents.
Some of the rights enumerated in the Basic Law include freedom of emigration, freedom
of travel, and the right to confidential legal advice. See Chow, supra note 15. Other
commentators have noted the Basic Law's vagueness. "We haven't a clue as to what it
means," says Professor Michael DeGolyer, Director of the Hong Kong Transition Project,
a multi-university research project. See Webb, supra note 19.
23. Henderson, supra note 11, at 529.
24. See id.
25. Basic Law, supra note 17, art. 8 reprinted in 29 LL.M. 1519, 1521 (1990); see also
Joint Declaration, supra note 3, para. 3(3), at 1371.
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Articles 4 and 5 contain the key elements of the Basic Law.
Article 5 provides that the PRC's socialist system shall not be
practiced in Hong Kong and that the existing capitalist system
shall remain unchanged for fifty years. 26 Here, I share some of Mr.
Fung's optimism that the PRC will keep its promise-not only
because it is in the PRC's interest, but also because the socialist
system once so dominant in the PRC is rapidly converting into a
capitalist system in everything but name!
The promise in article 4 covering the rule of law, however,
worries me and causes me to be more pessimistic than Mr. Fung.
Article 4 of the basic law provides: "The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall safeguard the rights and freedoms of
the residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
and of other persons in the Region in accordance with law."
' 7
Adequate safeguarding of these rights and freedoms in accordance
with the law requires two things: (1) laws that guarantee these
rights and freedoms, and (2) an independent and professional
judiciary and bar that enforce the laws against the government-
both the Hong Kong and the PRC governments. I am afraid that
beyond 1997, neither requirement will be met.2
V. THE RULE OF LAW IN THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
Mr. Fung has made a strong and impassioned argument in a
sincere attempt to reassure us, and perhaps himself, that the rule
of law, which has existed in Hong Kong for one hundred years
under "British rule," will continue for at least another fifty years
under "Chinese rule."29  I use the terms "British rule" and
"Chinese rule" to stress a sometimes overlooked point: Hong
26. Basic Law, supra note 17, art. 5, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519, 1521 (1990).
27. Id. art. 4.
28. See Anna Han, Hong Kong's Basic Law: The Path to 1997, Paved with Pitfalls, 16
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 325-35 (1993). Han discusses concerns with veto
power under article 17, national laws under article 18, jurisdiction under article 19, and
treason and sedition under article 23, in addition to concerns with the economic provi-
sions of the Basic Law. See id.
29. See Speech by Daniel Fung, supra note 13.
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Kong was not a democracy under British rule;0 nor will it be a
democracy under Chinese rule. The people of Hong Kong did not
choose the current chief executive, Governor Chris Patten; a
foreign sovereign, without the advice and consent of any
democratically elected Hong Kong political entity, appointed him.
A distant, if not foreign, sovereign, without the advice and consent
of any democratically elected Hong Kong political entity will also
choose the next chief executive. .Thus, the rule of law in Hong
Kong has existed for the past one hundred years not because the
people of Hong Kong chose it, but because a foreign sovereign
chose it for them. Similarly, the rule of law will exist in Hong
Kong for another fifty years or more not because the people of
Hong Kong choose it, but because the PRC government decides to
allow them to have it - for the PRC's benefit and on the PRC's
terms.
Mr. Fung's optimism appears to be based on two factors: (1)
the PRC has promised to maintain the rule of law in Hong Kong,
and (2) the PRC may be trusted to keep its promise, partly
because the government filed a record of its promise with the
30. The British government has been called a "benevolent dictator" regarding its
governance of the Crown Colony of Hong Kong. Henderson, supra note 5, at 514. Until
very recently, the British government decided what was "in the best interests of Hong
Kong," and the Chinese residents of the territory had little or no voice in the government
that "represented" them. Id.
Prior to 1982, the Urban Council was the only publicly elected governmental
body in Hong Kong and the right to vote was held only by those who met certain
educational, financial, or occupational qualifications. As a result, only 34,381
residents of Hong Kong were registered to vote in 1981 and only 6,195 actually
voted in the 1981 elections, a minute fraction of the potential electorate of
440,000.
NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 118-25 (4th ed.
1986); see also Henderson, supra note 5, at 520.
But when the British realized they had no choice but to relinquish control of
Hong Kong to the PRC, they decided to introduce democracy to the Hong Kong Chinese.
The British portrayal of themselves, as the promoters of democracy in Hong Kong has
been called "a distortion of the very nature of the British rule:"
The astonishing truth of the failure of the Hong Kong Chinese to develop a
significant pro-democracy or pro-independence movement, while other
British colonies obtained independence long ago, testifies to the success of the
British laws in accomplishing the goal of continued colonial rule over this land
of six million inhabitants.
Richard Klein, Law and Racism in an Asian Setting: An Analysis of the British Rule of
Hong Kong, 18 HASTINGS INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 223,255 (1995).
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United Nations. I am less certain than Mr. Fung that Great
Britain and the PRC mutually agree on what the PRC has
promised and far less certain that the PRC will in fact keep its
promise. Given the PRC's continuing threat to invade Taiwan, it
seems unlikely that either world opinion or a U.N. resolution will
be very effective in forcing the PRC to keep its promise.
A. The PRC's Promise
1. Changes in Hong Kong's Laws
a. Reinstatement of Old Colonial Laws and Changes to the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights
The PRC will almost certainly reinstate the recently repealed
colonial laws that governed Hong Kong during British rule. Some
of these provisions, such as the Emergency Regulations
Ordinance, date back to 1949, when the Communists took power
in China, and 1967, when pro-Communist riots took place in Hong
Kong." These laws provide wide-ranging emergency powers of
detention and censorship, although many have never been used.3 2
The Hong Kong government repealed many of these laws after the
introduction of the Hoig Kong Bill of Rights in 1991. It has also
promised to repeal other laws that the PRC may abuse after it
regains control of Hong Kong in 1997. 3 Furthermore, the Hong
Kong government is planning to introduce new regulations to
safeguard freedom of the press.
The PRC has indicated, however, that it will re-6nact many of
these laws upon the return of Hong Kong and neighboring
territories to the PRC in 1997. The legal affairs sub-group of the
PRC's Preliminary Working Committee (PWC) is the advisory
body to the Chinese government on Hong Kong's change of
sovereignty in 1997. The PWC is planning to repeal or restrict
Hong Kong's Bill of Rights, which incorporates provisions of
several U.N. conventions on human rights and which Mr. Fung
31. See Fearing Abuse by Chinese, Hong Kong Eases Stiff Laws, DES MOINES REG.,
June 24, 1995, at 11, available in LEXIS, NEWS library, Curn'ws File.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id
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himself helped draft, and reinstate laws that limit civil rights. It is
believed that the PWC's proposals are carved in stone because the
Hong Kong Committee endorsed them. The existence of the PWC
is not publicly acknowledged. It is supposedly led by Chinese
President Jiang Zemin, and it includes Prime Minister Li Peng and
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, as well as the two senior officials
directly responsible for Hong Kong affairs.
Under the PWC's proposals, the Hong Kong Bill of Rights
will not preempt other legislation with which it conflicts. Old
.colonial laws, for example, allowing censorship of television,
banning organizations from associating with overseas political
organizations, and requiring groups of more than thirty people to
apply for a permit to hold a public gathering, will be restored. 5
British officials contend that any changes to the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights will contravene the Joint Declaration. The fact that
the colonial laws were repealed long after the Joint Declaration,
however, weakens their position. The PRC may argue, with much
force, that it is only obligated to preserve laws that were in place in
Hong Kong in 1984, not laws Great Britain magnanimously
approved after it agreed to relinquish control of Hong Kong. The
PRC's position, according to Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen
Guofang, is that the enactment of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights
and the repeal of the colonial laws "violated the principles agreed
by China and Britain that laws in Hong Kong should remain
basically unchanged and important issues during the transitional
period should be settled through bilateral consultations.,
36
To make matters worse, a Foreign Office clerical error in
early 1993 "has forced the Hong Kong government to seek the
revalidation of more than two hundred laws passed in the colony
to avoid legal challenge [in] the courts."37  One of Governor
Patten's first constitutional changes, relinquishment of his position
as president of the Legislative Council in favor of an elected
35. See Stephen Vines, China to Return Colonial Law in Hong Kong in '97: Leaders
Worry About Losing Control, VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 8, 1995, at Al.
36. See Xu Yang, China Reserves Right to Review Hong Kong Laws, CHINA DAILY,
Oct. 25, 1995, at 23.
37. See Graham Hutchings, Internationak Reform Laws for Hong Kong Must Be Re-
validated, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 25, 1995, at 19, available in 1995 WL
7992889.
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successor, required amendments to -the Letters Patent and. the
Royal Instructions, which Great Britain uses to govern Hong
Kong.f The Privy Council considered the amendments in
December 1992, and the Queen approved them.3 ' Due to the
clerical error, however, the amendments were published as an
official government document in Hong Kong before the Queen
signed them.4 This error opened to legal challenge the
appointment of Sir John Swaine as President of Legco in early
1993 and all the laws passed during his termof office.4 The Hong
Kong government initially said it regarded all laws passed as valid,
but later relented, and agreed to republish the relevant changes.4
This incident may create another basis for the PRC to disclaim any
obligation to enforce them.
b. Hong Kong's Laws and the Basic Law
In 1996, the Hong Kong government attempted to add treason
and subversion to its Official Secrets Act to make the Act
compatible with the Basic Law and eligible for treatment as a post-
transfer local law.43  The PRC government reacted angrily,
accusing Great Britain of using "blackmail" to force the PRC to
accept its proposed changes44 The PRC once again vowed to
eliminate "any obstructions that hinder implementation of Hong
Kong's Basic Law." 45 A Foreign Ministry spokesman reiterated,
that any Hong Kong laws the PRC views as violating the Basic
Law "will not be adopted as the law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region," and added that "any obstruction stirred
up before the year 1997 which sabotages or blocks the realization
of the Basic Law will be removed.,
46
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See China Says Britain Using "Blackmail" Over Hong Kong Subversion Law,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
Curnws File.
44. See i&L
45. Id.
46. Id.
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The Joint Declaration provides, in part, that "[r]ights and
freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of
assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of
correspondence, of strike ... will be ensured by law.... " 47 Article
27 of the Basic Law makes the same guarantees.48 While these
provisions seems to give the residents of the Hong Kong the
freedom of expression and the right to demonstrate peacefully,
Article 23 of the Basic Law, may take those rights away. It
provides that the SAR "shall enact laws of its own to prohibit any
act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central
People's Government....49
The crucial question is how the terms treason, secession,
sedition, subversion will be defined ... and by whom - the British or
the Chinese? The recent trial in Beijing of Wang Dan, a Chinese
graduate student, strikingly demonstrates the conflicting views in
Hong Kong and on the Mainland of what constitutes treason,
secession, sedition, and subversion. The Mainland court sentenced
Wang to 11 years in jail, while in Hong Kong, over 3,000 people
turned out to protest Mr. Wang's sentence, and the current
Legislative Council passed a motion urging his release.50
The "Chinese view" has been explained by Chinese Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen, who, in an interview with The Asian Wall
Street Journal, indicated that the media would be allowed to
criticize the Chinese government, but would not be allowed to "put
forward personal attacks on the Chinese leaders."5 In a country
governed by men-not by laws-it will be hard to do the one
without the other. Other Chinese officials have taken a harsher
stand, indicating, for example, that Hong Kong newspapers will
not be allowed to support independence for Tibet or Taiwan, and
47. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, para. 3(5), at 1371.
48. Basic Law, supra note 17, art. 27, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519, 1525 (1990).
49. Id. art 23, reprinted in 29 IL.M. 1519, 1525 (emphasis added). The PRC allegedly
insisted on including these provisions in the Basic Law as a result of the demonstrations
against the 1989 Tiananmen Square "incident," which have been held annually in Hong
Kong since 1989. Stephen Vines, Hong Kong Subversion Law Infuriates China, IN-
DEPENDENT (London), Nov. 27, 1996, at 6, available in 1996 WL 13509686.
50. See Webb, supra note 19.
51. id
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that the annual Hong Kong demonstrations commemorating the
anniversary of Tiananmen Square will be banned.52
In an attempt to provide prevent the Chinese "hard line"
approach to "political speech" from "spil[ing] over into Hong
Kong" in July,. the British53 are introducing "a new law on
subversion that seeks to guarantee freedom of expression in the
territory after 1997."- The new law, which amends the existing
Hong Kong Crimes Ordinance,5 5 provides that acts of subversion
and secession require that those committing them resort to force to
achieve the political changes they advocate. "The mere expression
of criticism as such does not constitute any of the new offenses
[covered by the amendments]. In all cases, some form of force or
violence [is required]." 56
The Chinese consider the adoption of these amendments a
violation of the "basic Agreement" and have suggested that the
U.K. "would be held responsible for its actions."' Beijing insists
that its hand-picked Hong Kong's legislature must enact laws
prohibiting subversion and secession after - not before the transfer
of sovereignty. 8  Therefore is seems clear that these new
amendments will "expire at the same time as the pre-handover
legislature."59
52. See Graham Hutchings, Hong Kong Subveriion Law Risks China Row, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 27,1996, at 14, available in 1996 WL 3996255.
53. Britain's human rights record in Hong Kong is not without blemish. In a 1995
report the United Nations Human Rights Committee called for stronger law protecting
women from discrimination and violence and better treatment of the Vietnamese refu-
gees then in Honk Kong detention camps. It also was critical of the fact that only one
third of the 60-seat Hong Kong legislature are directly elected and indicated that the re-
maining 40 seats give "undue weight to the views of the business community." U.N. Hu-
man Rights Body Says HK Not Up To Scratch, FAR EAST REUTER ECONOMIC NEWS,
Nov. 3, 1995.
54. Hutchings, supra note 52.
55. Ironically, the colony has had "fairly draconian laws" preventing sedition and
treason against the British government during its 150 year rule. Vines, supra note 49.
56. See Hutchings, supra note 52 (quoting Peter Lai, Secretary for Security for the
Hong Kong government).
57. Vines, supra note 49.
58. See Hutchings, supra note 54.
59. Hutchings, supra note 49. "Cynics interpret the British action as London's at-
tempt to create the appearance of having done its best to protect Hong Kong, in the full
knowledge that none of its actions are likely to survive more than weeks following
China's resumption of sovereignty on 1 July." Vines, supra note 49.
274 .[Vol. 19:263
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China's foreign minister, Qian Qichen, recently warned Hong
Kong that freedom of the press has limits. While repeating
promises that Hong Kong's freedoms will be protected after the
July 1, 1997, handover, with freedom of the press safeguarded by
law, Qian cautioned there are no legal protection for rumors and
personal attacks. He also stressed that Hong Kong must pass new
laws banning subversion, treason, and -others acts, including
stealing state secrets. Democracy and human rights activists in
Hong Kong rightly fear such laws will be used to restrict their
freedoms of speech, press and assembly.6
The Mainland government is already exerting pressure on
Chinese dissidents living in Hong Kong. It was reported that Yiu
Yung Chin, who had been jailed for a year in China after taking
part in the 1989 protests in Shanghai and had fled to Hong Kong
for safety, was harassed by Chinese agents at his home. He
subsequently sought refuge in the U.S. British officials in Hong
Kong immediately begin to try to find homes abroad for the eighty
or so Chinese dissidents living in Hong Kong.61
2. The Judicial System
There seems to be little doubt that an "independent judiciary"
is indispensable for maintaining the rule of law that has exists in
Hong Kong under British governance. There also seems to be no
more doubt among many in Hong Kong, as well as in the West,
that the "rule" of law is essential to the economic success of the
HKSAR. Some commentators state that the ability to have
contracts enforced in court and to challenge the government or
anybody else-including close relatives of Mainland politicians-
in court is crucial to maintaining a healthy businesses
environment.62 If Beijing believed this, it might be more likely to
preserve the British legal system, at least for the next 50 years as it
has promised to do. But why should the PRC government believe
that an independent judiciary and the rule of law are that
60. China Lays Down Law on Hong Kong's Media, REC. N. NJ., Nov. 3, 1996, at
A07, available in 1996 WL 6116149.
61. See Urgent Search, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 8, 1996, at 12, available in 1996
WL-FEER 10569556.
62. See Webb, supra note 19.
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important; it has one of the fastest growing economies in the world
without either!
a. The Court of Final Appeal
A Court of Final Appeal (CFA) will be established to replace
Britain's Privy Council as guarantor of Hong Kong's separate legal
system." "Civil libertarians are counting on the court to protect
Hong Kong's freedoms, [while] the business community expects it
to guarantee the commercial laws that make Hong Kong a safe
international financial center.""
According to the Hong Kong government, the court will have
"precisely the same function and jurisdiction as the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council,"' ' which is currently the final
appellate body-but it may not! After months of hard bargaining,
Great Britain finally conceded and agreed to exempt "acts of
state" from the court's powers. Thus, the court will have no power
to adjudicate matters involving "acts of state."66 While the
jurisdiction of the Privy Council is similarly restricted in Great
Britain and other common law jurisdictions, acts of state are
defined narrowly, and the judges themselves define it.6 In Hong
Kong, the doctrine may be more broadly defined, and more
importantly, the PRC-appointed chief executive may define it.
The Basic Law provides that the courts shall obtain a
certificate from the chief executive on questions of fact concerning
acts of state and that this certificate shall be binding on the
courts." The Hong Kong government asserts that the certificate
relates to facts, not the interpretation of an act of state.6 It points
out that it is similar to the common law principle that a certificate
issued by the executive in respect of acts of state is conclusive as to
63. As Solicitor General, Mr. Fung will help oversee the necessary creation of a
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeals. See Cummings, supra note 1.
64. Britain, China Agree to Save Hong Kong's Legal System, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June
10, 1995, at A22.
65. Geoffrey M. Lewis, Letter, Fears for Rule of Law in Hong Kong, TIMES
(London), July 13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7682071.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See J.F. Mathews, Letter, Hong Kong Rule of Law, TIMES (London), July 25,
1995, available in 1995 WL 7686246.
69. See id.
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the facts stated in it.70  The distinction between law and fact,
however, is elusive-American courts and legal scholars cannot
agree on it. It seems unlikely that a PRC-appointed chief
executive, especially one with only business experience, will fully
appreciate the difference.
One of Great Britain's most respected constitutional scholars,
Professor Sir William Wade, believes that fears regarding the acts
of state exemptions are unfounded because the Joint Declaration
requires future Hong Kong courts to follow English common law
precedent.7' He notes "that the Crown has probably not claimed
acts of state in Great Britain as a defense since 1970."72 Sir
William adds:
The law of Acts of State is a well-known branch of English law
in which it is quite clear that what is or is not an Act of State is
decided by the court. That law is intended to continue (in
Hong Kong courts). So there is no possibility of the Chinese
being able to say that whatever they like to call an Act of State
is an Act of State and so withdraw it from the jurisdiction of the
CFA.
73
The Hong Kong government has asserted that the act of state
exemption may not be used to usurp court authority over events
on home territory. As an example, it contends that the PRC
could not claim that the closure of a Taiwanese business in Hong
Kong would be immune from judicial scrutiny as an act of state.75
Such a position is extremely naive!
Although I do not doubt Sir William's understanding of how
British courts would interpret the acts of state doctrine, it is not
certain that the PRC-appointed chief executive would interpret.
the acts of state doctrine the same way as Sir William. Indeed,
Tam Yiu Chung, a pro-China legislator, told his fellow Hong Kong
legislators that China's National People's Congress would decide
what falls within CFA jurisdiction.76
70. See id.
71. See Robin Fitzsimons, Is Hong Kong Facing a Legal Sell-out?, TIMES (London),
Aug. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7687409.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See i
76. See id.
2771997]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
I am not alone in my concern. Sir Percy Cradock, Great
Britain's former ambassador in Beijing, describes the acts of state
provision as "dangerouslj broad."'n  Justice Michael Kirby,
executive chairman of the International Commission of Jurists and
President. of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, agrees that
"any reference to an Act of State exemption in a society such as
the People's Republic of China is fraught with danger."'78 A U.S.
lawyer in Hong Kong has described it as creating "a loophole
through which you can drive a truck."79 University of Virginia law
professor A.E. "Dick" Howard, who has taught in Hong Kong,
adds that the idea of "separation of powers" may well be
"incomprehensible and possibly unacceptable" under Chinese
rule. °
It appears most likely that any case involving the powers of
the post-1997 Hong Kong government will concern Hong Kong's
relationship with the PRC's central authorities. If an act of state
was claimed, it could easily be viewed as a question of fact on
which the CFA must obtain a certificate from the chief executive.
Such a certificate would be binding on the Court, implying that the
Chief Executive will have a means of limiting the CFA's
jurisdiction simply by requiring consultation with the PRC.'
Currently, British soldiers stationed in Hong Kong are subject
to the local jurisdiction of Hong Kong civilian courts for non-
military offenses, just like U.S. soldiers stationed in Japan are
subject to Japanese civil law.2 This will change when jurisdiction
is transferred to the PRC in 1997. The PRC government has
announced that Chinese soldiers based in Hong Kong will not be
subject to local laws. 3 This announcement appears to be another
instance where the PRC government is flouting the Basic Law,
which stipulates that "members of the garrison shall abide by laws
77. See id.
78. Id
79. Peter Stein, Hong Kong Legal Regime Thrown into Doubt, WALL St. J. (Eur.),
Apr. 10, 1995, at 2, available in 1995 WL-WSJE 2147744.
80. Reske, supra note 4, at 33.
81. See Geoffrey Lewis, Letter, Hong Kong Rule of Law, TIMES (London), Aug. 14,
1995, available in 1995 WL 7690169.
82. See Jonathan Mirsky, China to Exempt Its Garrison in Hong Kong from Local
Law, TIMES (London), Sept. 12,1996, available in 1996 WL 6518566.
83. See id
278 [Vol. 19:263
"Rule of Law" in Hong Kong After 1997
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. '' 4 When
members of a pro-Peking political group told a Chinese
spokesperson that this statement violated the Basic Law, the
spokesperson responded that regardless of what the Basic Law
provides, "it would be very difficult for the People's Liberation
Army to give its soldiers to the local courts. ' '
Realistically, a law affecting the powers of Hong Kong's post-
1997 government will not be left to the judges of the new court."
An application in proceedings before the Privy Council to
judicially review an act of the post-1997 government is not likely to
have the same chance of success as it would have had before
1997.' These concerns belie Mr. Fung's claim that the CFA will
continue the rule of law in Hong Kong8M
The Joint Declaration provides that three of the four
permanent Hong Kong judges on the CFA .may be of any
nationality. " Only the Chief Justice must be of Chinese descent
from Hong Kong." Mr. Fung believes that a majority of
non-Chinese justices will be appointed to 'serve on the CFA,
apparently referring to the British subjects now serving as judges
in Hong Kong under appointment by the Crown, thereby
reflecting "the character of Hong Kong now as an international
community." 9' I can only point out that the provision would also
permit the appointment of judges from Mainland China.
Under the Joint Declaration, the CFA should have been able
to invite more than one judge from other common law
jurisdictions to join it, according to the nature of the appeals that it
decided.2 Great Britain was forced to agree, however, to include
only one external judge on the five-member court, outraging
lawyers and legislators.93
84. I&
85. 1L
86. See Lewis, supra note 65.
87. See id.
88. See Speech by Daniel Fung, supra note 13.
89. See Barrie Wiggham, Letter to the Editor, No Legal Vacuum in Hong Kong,
WASH. POsT, Aug. 14, 1995, at A16.
90. See id.
91. Cummings, supra note 1.
92. See id.
93. See Fitzsimons, supra note 71.
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Finally, the British conceded an important point on timing.
The new court will not officially form until July 1, 1997, when
British rule ends and Beijing takes over. Of course, had the CFA
been established last year, as the British wanted,'4 the U.K., acting
through the present governor of Hong Kong, would have made the
judicial appointments, undoubtedly mainly from the present Hong
Kong judiciary. China's rejection of this proposal is strong
evidence that it has- other plans for who it will appoint to the CFA
and it undoubtedly wanted to avoid the embarrassment of
,removing the British appointees and replacing them with less
qualified jurists. 95
Thus, it will begin to operate only at the moment of transition,
with no experience or record under the British. If the court begins
to operate earlier, it may develop both an expertise and a body of
judicial precedent on important issues, like the scope of the acts of
state doctrine, while still under British control. This precedent
subsequently could apply after 1997. Perhaps this is why Beijing
insisted on delay of implementation until it took control of Hong
Kong and its courts.
The Solicitor General dismisses this view by pointing out that
a "landslide" thirty-eight to seventeen* vote in the Hong Kong
legislative council approved the Court of Final Appeal
agreement.6 He fails to mention that Legco originally refused to
ratify the provisions and that Legco later ratified it only after
Great Britain said that the agreement could not be amended.9 He
also does not mention that almost all the, directly elected Legco
members voted against the CFA Bill and in favor of amendments
that they argued would protect Hong Kong's freedoms.9
94. One of the reasons was that the British wanted the CFA established and operat-
ing last year was that the British Privy Council, which has been the "court of last resort"
for Hong Kong decisions had a large backlog and wanted to stop hearing Hong Kong ap-
peals sometime last year, as soon as the Hong Kong CFA had been established. See
Webb, supra note 19.
95. See id
96. Wiggham, supra note 89.
97. See Fitzsimons, supra note 71.
98. See Britain, China Agree to Save Hong Kong's Legal System, supra note 64.
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b. The Lower Courts
The concern over the CFA should not overlook the staffing of
the lower courts in Hong Kong after July 1. These appointees are
viewed by some as "the true test of judicial independence." 99 Will
these judges be selected on the basis of their legal qualifications or
their political allegiance to Beijing? If we couldn't have guessed
before the selection of the Chief Executive, the answer must be
obvious now.' 0 Even an internationally respected appellate can
not undo the harm cause by a politically motivated trial court.
3. The Independence of the Bar
In addition to an independent judiciary, the "rule of law"
needs a free and independent Bar to survive. With a system
modeled after the respected British system and with many of the
members of the Bar educated and trained in the Inns of Court in
London, Hong Kong has had a strong and independent Bar.'1 But
recent developments restricting the practice of law on the
Mainland do not bode well for the Hong Kong Bar.
The practice of law on the Mainland is presently under the
joint control of the Lawyers' Society and the Ministry of Justice
and the vast majority of Mainland law firms actually operate as
"state-owned units."'" A new "lawyers' law" proposed last year
would have allowed lawyers with three years experience to set up
their own law firms and would have transferred the authority to
administer qualifying examinations and to discipline lawyers from
the Ministry of Justice to the Lawyers' Society.0 3 Local lawyers
viewed these proposals "as important steps in building up the legal
profession in China" by creating a more independent Bar.'e4 But
the Law Committee of the National People's Committee Standing
99. See Webb, supra note 19
100. Article 88 of the Basic Law says that Hong Kong SAR judges "shall be appointed
by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of an independent commission composed
of local judges, persons from the legal profession and eminent persons from other sec-
tors." Basic Law, supra note 17, art. 88, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519, 1534 (1990). But
who will appoint the "recommenders?" The answer is clear: Beijing!
101. See Daniel Kwan, Lawyers' Law Takes Step Back on Reform, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 15, 1996, at 8.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
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Committee eliminated both provisions. Xue Ju, director of the
Law Committee, was quoted as saying the provisions were
removed because "China still lacked experience in these
matters."'0 5 But the real reason undoubtedly is Beijing's fear that
it would be unable to control a truly independent Bar. There is no
reason, given that Beijing announced its intention to restrict
personal freedoms of its Honk Kong citizens that it will tolerate a
free and independent Bar in Hong Kong anymore than it will on
the Mainland.
If what has happened in Beijing is any indication, client
confidentiality may also be in jeopardy. Last September, Beijing
demanded quarterly reports on information usually considered
confidential, for example, client lists, locations of projects under
consideration, affiliations with Chinese law firms, business
reference lists, and the value of deals in negotiation.' Foreign
lawyers objected strenuously, calling these new requirements "a
gross breach of confidentiality," but the Justice Ministry insists it
intends to enforce the regulation.' 7
4. The Post-handover Legislature
Annex I of the Joint Declaration provides that the HKSAR
legislature "shall be constituted by elections."'0 8 To implement this
provision, the Chinese National People's Congress passed a
resolution providing that the first post-handover Legislative
Council was to be comprised of sixty members, twenty of whom
were to be directly elected by "geographical constituencies," thirty
selected by "functional constituencies," and the remaining ten
appointed by an election committee.0 9 Beijing, however, has
already reneged again. It announced that it will initially replace
Hong Kong's current, democratically elected legislature, with a
105. Id. New regulations from the Ministry of Justice also forbid foreign firms from
hiring Chinese lawyers, and may require them to terminate those already on staff. Matt
Forney, Outside the Law: Reform Reversals Hit Foreign Law Firms in China, FAR E.
ECON. REv., Jan. 2, 1997, at 18, available in 1997 WL-FEER 2009632.
106. See China Wants Lawyers' Confidential Info, Dow JONES INT'L NEws 8ERV.,
Sept. 18, 1996, at 22:54:00.
107. Forney, supra note 105.
108. .loint Declaration, supra note 3, annex 1, at 1373.
109. Annex II of the Basic Law guarantees that subsequent legislatures will be
"'increasingly democratic." Basic Law, supra note 17, annex II reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519,
1547 (1990); see also Webb, supra note 19
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"Provisional Legislature," which like the HKSAR chief executive,
will be chosen by a Selection Committee established by Beijing."'
In fact, the Selection Committee essentially voted itself into
office, taking fifty-one of the seats, while giving the remaining nine
seats to "pro-China figures" who were not members of the
committee. "' Martin Lee, chairman of Hong Kong's Democratic
Party, immediately threatened to challenge the constitutionality of
the Provisional Legislature by asking a Hong Kong court to
declare the interim congress illegal and to prevent it from
meeting."' Great Britain proposes to try a different approach. It
wants the World Court to decide whether Beijing violated the 1984
Basic Agreement by ignoring the provision that requires the new
Hong Kong legislature to be "elected.""'
Predictably, the PRC refused to submit the dispute to the
World Court's jurisdiction, labeling it an "internal affair," and
describing Britain's attempt "to play any international' card" as
"futile.""1
4
B. The Likelihood That the PRC Will Keep Its Promises
Although one may only speculate whether the PRC will honor
its promise, it has already broken its promises concerning the
CFA. Senior Chinese officials have openly threatened that the
PRC will abolish both Hong Kong's Bill of Rights and its common
law system."5 Some expect new laws on treason, the press, and
taxation, as well as electoral laws that guarantee all future
legislatures will be filled with PRC functionaries." 6. Furthermore,
actions speak louder than words! The PRC's respect for the rule
of law today serves as the best evidence of how the PRC will honor
its commitments to Hong Kong.
110. Beijing has now promised that elections will take place sometime in 1998. See
Webb, supra note 19.
111. See Kevin Platt, Hong Kong Enters a Legal Quagmire: Whose Legislature,
Courts, and Police Rule?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 23, 1996, at 7, available in
1996 WL 5046370.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. Id
115. See Martin C.M. Lee, Why China Needs Hong Kong's Legal System, WALL ST. J.
(Asian), Jan. 3, 1995, at 6, available in 1995 WL-WSJA 2131203.
116. See id
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Last year, the Chinese naval police arrested two Hong Kong
seamen suspected of smuggling while they were within Hong
Kong's territorial waters.1 7 The PRC government's willingness to
ignore Hong Kong's sovereignty while still under British jurisdic-
tion is strong evidence that the PRC will ignore the "one country-
two systems" slogan. Even if the PRC does not formally repeal
Hong Kong's laws, Chinese authorities who do not understand or
respect such laws will undermine their effectiveness.
The absence of the rule of law in the PRC affects not only
smugglers, but also businessmen. Without the rule of law doctrine,
when Chinese business transactions go sour, businessmen may
expect financial losses without any legal recourse at best, and
imprisonment in a Chinese jail at worst, as several recent incidents
demonstrate.
The Hong Kong Bill of Rights guarantees freedom of speech,
but it is generally believed that the PRC government will not
tolerate criticism in Hong Kong any more than it does at home.
The case of Hong Kong entrepreneur and publisher Jimmy Lai is
evidence of the PRC's lack of tolerance. Last year, shortly after he
criticized Chinese Premier Li Peng in his magazine, the Chinese
government closed down the Beijing branch of his clothing store."8
For foreign businessmen, the fact that over the past three
years, at least fifteen Hong Kong and overseas Chinese
businessmen, including one California businessman that I know
personally, have been arrested and held hostage in China due to
business ventures that went sour should be most distressing."9
Perhaps the case of James Peng, former managing director of
Shenzhen Champaign Industrial Company (Champaign), is the
most notorious.
In July 1993, Champaign's directors challenged its
shareholders for control of the company. 12 A Hong Kong court's
ruling kept Champaign under the control of its main shareholder, a,
117. See Stein, supra note 79.
118. See Lee, supra note 115.
119. See id.
120. See Lina Shen-Peng, Rule of Law Must Prevail in China, ASIA WALL ST. J., Nov.
9,1994 (describing the author's husband's arrest and incarceration).
121. See Stein, supra note 79.
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Hong Kong company. "2 Nevertheless, Shenzhen government
officials ignored the court's ruling and allowed Champaign's
directors to appropriate the Hong Kong shareholder's entire
interest in the company, about seventy-five million dollars, without
any compensation.'23
Mr. James Peng, an Australian citizen, was treated like the
two Hong Kong crewmen. According to Mr. Peng's wife and
friends, in October 1993, Chinese public security officers detained
Mr. Peng while he was visiting Macao, which, like Hong Kong, is
not yet subject to Chinese jurisdiction.' 24 He was held without
charge for more than one year.'2 Eventually, Mr. Peng was tried
for corruption, but the judge ordered the prosecutors to establish a
better case against him before proceeding. 126 At last report, he
was still in a Chinese jail.'27
It is possible that the slowness of the Hong Kong judicial
system will frustrate the Chinese judicial system, which generally
practices swift justice, at least if the prosecution of George Tan is
typical. In 1979, Mr. Tan acquired a Hong Kong company.'2 With
loans from several prominent Malaysian banks, Bumiputra
Malaysia Finance Limited and its parent Bank Bumiputra
Malaysia Bhd., Mr. Tan created a billion dollar empire, which
included a travel company, a taxi fleet, and about sixty ships.'29
When Hong Kong's property market became depressed in 1982,
the company was unable to repay its loans.30 Within one year, the
company went bankrupt, with estimated net debts of about $1
122. See id
123. See id.
124. See id. Macao is scheduled to be returned to the Chinese in 1998. See Paul Fi-
foot, One Country, Two Systems- Mark II: From Hong Kong to Macao, 12 INT'L REL
25 (1995).
125. See Stein, supra note 79.
126. Id.
127. See ii.
128. See Erik Guyot, Tan Case Ends, But Questions Remain, ASIAN WALL ST., Sept.
23, 1996, at 3, available in 1996 WL-WSJA 12474087.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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billion.' In July 1993, an auditor investigating the bank loans to
Tan's company was murdered in a hotel room.'32
Tan was first prosecuted in Hong Kong on fraud charges in
1987, but was acquitted after highly controversial case.'33 Mr.
Tan's lawyers allegedly outmaneuvered government prosecutors in
several subsequent cases.'34 He remained free on bail until
September 1996, when he plead guilty to conspiring with three
executives from the Malaysian banks to defraud the banks of $238
million.'35 During the thirteen years that Mr. Tan was free on bail,
he continued to engage in a number of questionable transactions.'36
For example, as recently as 1992, he helped arrange a $500 million
purchase of an office building by a mysterious Chinese-backed
consortium. '37
While the, Hong Kong government, eventually won the case
against Mr. Tan, the government is still pursuing a four-year old
investigation of the 'Allied Group companies in connection with
serious violations of stock exchange rules.38 In another case, it
took the government four years to complete an investigation into
one of Hong Kong's largest takeovers of a listed company.
139
Mr. Tan's eventual guilty plea is evidence that Hong Kong's
legal system can uncover fraud and corruption in Hong Kong's
laissez-faire business world.1 41 Its ability to do so after July 1997,
especially,if one of the principals is a highly-placed Chinese official
or his son and daughter, remains to be seen; however, it seems
unlikely.
141
In reaction to the threat that the impending transfer of
jurisdiction will disrupt commercial law, businessmen are drafting
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Erik Guyot, Hong Kong Legal System Is Under Scrutiny, And More Test
Cases Await, WALL ST. J. (Asian), Sept. 23,1996 at 3.
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agreements to avoid the jurisdiction of Hong Kong courts. Many
Hong Kong-listed companies have relocated, at least on paper.143
"More than half of the 529 companies listed on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange at the end of 1994 had their legal domiciles in
Bermuda or the British West Indies."'" In addition to the benefit
of favorable tax laws, they may be seeking to avoid any
uncertainty following the transfer.'
Hong Kong-based Regent Fund Management Limited, for
example, may move out of Hong Kong before 1997, possibly to
Singapore or Kuala Lumpur. 46 According to Managing Director
Peter Everington, one big reason for leaving is "uncertainty over
the prospects for law and order."' 47 Referring to the importance of
personal connections rather than enforceable legal rights in the
PRC, Mr. Everington noted that the "rule of law in China is based
on advocacy, while here [in Hong Kong] it is based on the judicial
system."'"
The possibility of foreign businesses moving their regional
operations elsewhere appears to have some lawyers also making
preparations to move. 49 In 1995, applications from Hong Kong
lawyers for permission to practice law in Singapore rose to 216,
compared with 86 for all of 1994.150 As a result, Singapore
announced that it would tighten procedures for licensing Hong
Kong lawyers to practice in Singapore.
5 '
As further evidence of the lack of confidence in the future of
Hong Kong's judicial system, the Arbitration Law Reform
Subcommittee, comprised of the Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) and the Hong Kong Branch of the
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, has proposed amending the
existing Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance to reduce the role of
142. See Stein, supra note 79.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id
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the Hong Kong courts.' The subcommittee suggests that the
HKIAC, rather than the Hong Kong High Court, should be
authorized to appoint arbitrators if the parties are unwilling or
unable.' It proposes allowing arbitrators to order interim
measures of protection and security for costs and limiting the
interim measures that the High Court may grant.-" Finally, the
subcommittee recommends repealing the High Court's power to
order discovery, and instead, giving arbitrators the authority to
order discovery, to grant extensions of time for commencing
arbitration proceedings, and to dismiss a claim for want of
prosecution."'s It also proposes giving arbitrators the power to
determine their own jurisdiction in both domestic and
international arbitrations,'5 6 thereby further restricting the role of
post-1997 Hong Kong courts in the supervision of arbitrations in
Hong Kong.'7
VI. SINGAPORE AS A MODEL FOR THE "NEW" HONG KONG
Many Asians see Singapore as "a role model for China,
Vietnam, and other rapidly, industrializing countries of the
region.' '5 8 Many, if not most, businessmen in Hong Kong and in
the West would welcome a Singapore-like legal system in Hong
Kong because it is based on the belief that restraints on individual
freedoms are sometimes necessary for economic success.5 9
Singapore's strict laws, especially against corruption, are
152. See Reformation of Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance Initiated on Island,
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., June 1996, at 19.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. There is some evidence that the "unsettled state" of Hong Kong's legal system
after July 1 is already having "an adverse impact on Hong Kong business." Specifically,
Hong Kong companies that would have previously included arbitration clauses in their
contracts providing for arbitration in Hong Kong are now providing for arbitration in
foreign venues. See Hong Kong Arbitration Threatened by Approaching Chinese Sover-
eignty, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 82 (1996).
158. Steve Raymer, Laying Down the Law in Singapore, Tough Policies, Beautiful
Country, SUN (Baltimore), Aug. 27, 1995, at 1M, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
Curnws File.
159. See id.
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considered an important economic asset. 64 Bribery, kickbacks,
and other forms of corruption are uncommon in Singapore. 
16
Foreign businessmen know that Singapore courts, which are also
based on the British model, will treat them honestly and fairly.'62
Others have a different view of Singapore and its legal system.
Some have called Singapore a "police state" with an "inflexible
legal code," noting that the fine for buying, selling, or chewing
gum is $500 and the fine for failing to flush a public toilet is $100.'
"Remote-control cameras photograph speeders, red-light runners,
and forgetful flushers. Lawbreakers sometimes find their pictures
prominently displayed in the unanimously pro-government
newspapers."'64
More serious concern is expressed, usually by foreigners,
about freedom of speech and the press. It is generally
acknowledged that open criticism of the government may result in
imprisonment. The government even blacks out television news
programs that are critical of the government.'6
Many Singapore businessmen claim to like Singapore's strict
rules, 16 which are said to make business fast and efficient.16 Hong
Kong businessmen may agree, secretly hoping for such a system in
Hong Kong-a system that is fair and impartial to businessmen
but tough on common criminals. Hong Kong businessmen forget
two important distinctions, however, between Singapore and the
PRC. First, business deals that go sour for the Chinese company
are often viewed as economic crimes and the foreign businessman
is generally treated like a common criminal. Second, nearly all
businesses in Singapore are privately owned, allowing the
government to be a neutral arbiter of disputes between them. In
contrast, the Chinese government, directly or indirectly through
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. Veronica Chia, Editorial, Singapore: A Nation of Laws, PORTLAND ORE-
GONIAN, May 29, 1995, at B06, available in 1995 WL 3604368; Raymer, supra note 158.
164. Raymer, supra note 158.
165. See Chia, supra note 163.
166. Singapore businessmen, of course, would not openly express disagreement with
government policies. Freedom of speech and press are as popular with the Singapore
government as they are with the Beijing government.
167. See Raymer, supra note 158.
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the involvement of sons and daughters of government leaders in
the private sector, is involved in most major business ventures.
The government cannot be expected to be a neutral arbiter of
disputes in which they have a stake.
Unlike their Singapore counterparts, Chinese courts
steadfastly refuse to enforce foreign judgments. Notwithstanding
claims that foreign arbitration awards are routinely enforced in
China, there is growing evidence that large awards cannot be
effectively enforced. For example, Ross Engineering, a U.S.
company, won a $6.6 million arbitration award. against a
state-owned former joint venture partner, but has been unable to
enforce it.'68 The U.S. Secretary of Commerce intervened on
behalf of Ross Engineering and asked Foreign Trade Minister Wu
Yi if the award could be collected. 9 She allegedly smiled and said
no.1
7 0
VII. CONCLUSION
-If the PRC government continues to have no respect for the
rule of law, not to mention the lack of respect for the sovereign
territories of Hong Kong and Macao, how likely is it that it will
respect the rule of law and the quasi-independence of those
territories after they revert back to the PRC's control? Thus, I am
skeptical that the Basic Law, based on the idealistic but
unworkable principle of "one country, two systems," will
accomplish what it purports to promise. The Basic Law
guarantees freedoms and rights found in Western democracies.
Similarly, article 35 of the PRC Constitution guarantees Chinese
citizens freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, procession
and demonstration.' Nevertheless, the events in Tiananmen
Square made it clear that these guarantees are only hollow
168. See Lee, supra note 115.
169. See id
170. See id
171. Villanova law professor Joseph Dellapenna predicts that "criminal law and police
enforcement will be the first to undergo changes." Reske, supra note 4, at 33. He also
contends that "demonstrations will be suppressed and dissidents will disappear." Id.
University of Virginia law professor A.E. "Dick" Howard, who has taught in Hong Kong,
adds that "[t]here will be erosion" of freedoms in Hong Kong and freedom of the press
and freedom of speech "will be early casualties." Id
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promises. I am sure that the PRC's promises with respect to the
rule of law in Hong Kong will turn out to be equally hollow.
VIII. POSTSCRIPT
When I prepared this article as a response to Mr. Fung's
speech at Loyola law School early last year, I conceded that no one
really knew what would happen to Hong Kong and its "rule of
law" on July 1, 1997. I suggested that we were all speculating;
some like Mr. Fung were optimistic, other, like me, were
pessimistic. Only time would tell.
But much time has passed since then; the turnover is now only
months away. I think it is fair to say that everything that has
happened since then indicates that my "pessimistic view" is far
more likely to be the correct prediction than Mr. Fung's. The
Mainland's crack down on dissidents at home and its threat to
prevent anti-government demonstrations in Hong Kong may be
the best evidence that "free speech" will be tolerated no more in
Hong Kong than it is on the Mainland.
We also know who the Chief Executive of the SAR will be.' 2
While there can be little doubt that Mr. Tung Chee Hwa is an
astute and successful businessman; it is equally clear that he sees
no value in maintaining a Western legal system and is prepared to
follow directions coming from Beijing.173 There is only one piece
remaining to complete the puzzle-the selection of judges for the
CFA and the lower courts. Mr. Fung was optimistic that a good
number of the CFA judges would be foreigners; that seems
172. It will not be that Retired Hong Kong Chief Justice Tang Ti-liang unsuccessfully
competed for the chief-executive post. It is much more likely that a retired jurist would
have had a commitment to the "rule of law" that Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, a "shipping mag-
nate," will.
173. Mr. Hwa showed his "true colors" in January when he selected a 15-member Ex-
ecutive Council "dominated by leading pro-China professionals." Although most have
substantial business or government experience, they have been characterized as "a team
of professionals largely from the pro-China camp," by Lau Siu-kai, a professor at the Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong. Erik Guyot, Hong Kong Cabinet of Pro-China Aides Se-
lected by Tung, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2407083. Notably
absent from the Executive Committee were representatives of the Hong Kong Demo-
cratic Party led by firebrand Martin Lee. When asked why no Democrats were on the
Executive Council, Mr. Tung replied that both he and the other appointees were "very
democratic," prompting Mr. Lee to observe that "If Mr. Tung is a democrat, no one in
this world would be [considered a] conservative." Tung: I Am Very Democratic, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Jan. 26,1997, at 4, available in 1997 WL 2252393.
1997]
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"beyond the pale" now. All one can hope for is that they will be
Hong Kong Chinese, selected for their judicial experience on the
British-style Hong Kong courts - and the fierce sense of judicial
independence that goes with it.
Perhaps I will be proven wrong this time but the appointment
of pro-Beijing businessmen and politicians to the Selection
Committee that chose the Chief executive and the HKSAR's first
legislature,'74 means it is'unlikely that judicial selections will be
based more on competence than allegiance to the Mainland
government.
What may be most disturbing is the fact that the West, or at
least the United States, seems resigned to this result and will do
little if anything to prevent the PRC from imposing its version of
the "rule of law" on Hong Kong.'
5
174. Hutchings, supra note 37.
175. At a press conference in late January, President Clinton acknowledged that his
"engagement" policy in dealing with the PRC had had little effect in improving the PRC's
human rights record. Additional comments indicated that Mr. Clinton was resigned to
the probability that the Mainland will crack down on civil liberties when it resumes con-
trol of Hong Kong later this year. While he urged Beijing to "respect" human rights in
Hong Kong, he ruled out retaliation by the U.S. if the PRC did not do so. See Norman
Kempster, From Clinton, a Caution on Hong Kong, but No Threat Asia: President Urges
China to Respect Human Rights After July Hand-over, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29,1997, at A4.
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